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Introduction
The Utah Judicial Council appreciates the opportunity to file this Amicus Brief to
address the attack on the constitutionality of court commissioners. The Judicial Council
will not get into a factual dispute about what occurred at the lower court. However, the
Council would note that the facts provided in the Appellant's brief seem shy of the facts
that might be necessary to support the arguments made in the brief.
Argument
The amicus curiae's primary interest in this matter is the attack on the
constitutionality of the court commissioners' practices. In mounting a challenge, the
Appellant has relied on Holm v. Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992). Although
Holm is perhaps a relevant case, the constitutional discussion in the Holm lead opinion
was not accepted by a majority of the Court of Appeals panel members.1 A discussion on
the constitutionality of court commissioners should begin with the case of Salt Lake City

'"Judge Billings and I concur fully in the court's opinion except in one limited
respect. Our disagreement concerns the discussion of the non-delegability of core judicial
functions as a matter of constitutional law. In our view, such discussion would be
necessary only if the controlling statute and rule, by their terms, purported to vest
commissioners with the power exercised by the commissioner in this case . . . . However,
since the commissioner's actions were not even authorized by statute or rule, we see no
need to opine about the constitutional implications of such actions." Holm, 840 P.2d at
169.
1

v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994). The Appellants have not discussed Ohms, but this
case provides the framework for the practice of court commissioners. Ohms addressed
the authority of court commissioners in criminal cases. However, the Supreme Court also
provided guidance on the authority of court commissioners in civil cases.
Mr. Ohms was convicted in the Third Circuit Court of a class B misdemeanor. Mr.
Ohm's trial was presided over by a Third Circuit Court commissioner. At that time, the
court commissioner statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-31, stated:
Upon the informed consent of the defendant, the court
commissioner may conduct a jury or non-jury misdemeanor
trial in accordance with the lawr. Upon conviction, the
commissioner may impose sentence and enter final judgment.
The judgment entered by the commissioner shall be the final
judgment of the court for all purposes including appeal.
Id. at 848. Prior to his trial, Mr. Ohms had signed a waiver and consent form in which he
"consented to have his case tried and final judgment entered by a circuit court
commissioner." Id. at 846. Mr. Ohms appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of
Appeals, which then certified the appeal to the Supreme Court. Mr. Ohms specifically
challenged the constitutionality of § 78-3-31. Mr. Ohms alleged that it was an
unconstitutional delegation of "ultimate judicial power to court commissioners in
violation of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution." Id

2

The Utah Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Ohms and declared § 78-3-31 to be
unconstitutional to the extent that it granted core judicial functions to non-judges.
However, in making this determination, the Supreme Court recognized the valuable
services provided by commissioners. The court discussed the appropriate role of
commissioners in all court cases. The court stated:
As adjuncts of the court to which they are appointed, court
commissioners are authorized to exercise certain functions to
assist the court in the exercise of its core judicial powers. For
example, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-31(9) (1992) provides that
the judicial council establish the types of orders and relief
commissioners may recommend. Such provisions are
constitutionally sound, since ultimate decision-making
remains with the judge. . . . Court commissioners have
provided a valuable service to the judiciary for over thirty
years pursuant to constitutionally valid statutes. They have
conducted fact-finding hearings, held pre-trial conferences,
made recommendations to judges, and provided counseling
and other worthwhile functions. However, over that thirty
year period, commissioners were never allowed to perform
ultimate or core judicial functions such as entering final
orders and judgments or imposing sentence. In every case,
commissioner actions led to recommendations which resulted
in final review and signature by a judge. It was not until April
1990 that the current version of § 78-3-31 become effective,
giving rise to Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App.
1992), and the present case.
KLat851,n.l7
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The Ohms court explained that the reason core judicial functions could not be
delegated to non-judges is because "there are no provisions which subject them to the
constitutional checks and balances imposed upon duly appointed judges of courts of
record.'5 Id. at 851. Judges are more directly accountable to the public and therefore must
be the ones to make final decisions concerning members of the public. The court
explained that while Article VIII judges are the only ones that can exercise final decisionmaking authority, court commissioners "may perform many important functions in
assistance to courts of record." Id,
In State v. Thomas. 691 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah 1998), the Supreme Court explained
that core judicial functions include:
(1) the power to hear and determine controversies between
adverse parties and questions in litigation, (2) the authority to
hear and determine justiciable controversies, (3) the authority
to enforce any valid judgment, decree, or order, and (4) all
powers that are necessary to protect the fundamental integrity
of the judicial branch.
The court explained that "core judicial functions do not include functions that are
generally designed to 'assist' courts, such as conducting fact-finding hearings, holding
pre-trial conferences, and making recommendations to judges. In these instances, the
commissioner's actions are reviewable by a judge; thus, ultimate judicial power remains
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with the judge." i d A court commissioner may thus assist a district court by conducting
fact-finding hearings and making recommendations to a judge, as long as the judge has
ultimate and final decision-making authority in the case. In short, a judge has authority to
"hear and determine." A commissioner has authority to hear and recommend.
In the lead opinion in Holm, Judge Russon stated that the commissioner had
exceeded her authority by
(1) deciding Holm's motion for Utah to assume jurisdiction;
(2) Informing Holm's attorney that it was her order that the
Ohio change of custody order be enforced that night; (3)
ordering the police to enforce the undomesticated Ohio order;
and (4) denying Holm's attorney's request for a hearing
before the court with regard to the undomesticated Ohio
order.
In each of the situations the commissioner had "decid[ed]", order[ed], or "den[ied]"
relief. The Holm lead opinion further stated that the commissioner's acts could n< il lie
made valid by a subsequent "ratification" by a district court judge. I d The district court
judge had received a telephone call from the commissioner, in which the commissioner
consulted the judge. However, the commissioner made the final decisions. The district
court judge had also reviewed a motion for relief filed by Ms. Holm. However, the judge
did not conduct a direct, independent review of the commissioner's orders. The orders in
Holm were never considered to be recommendations.
5

The problem in both Ohms and Holm was that the commissioners in each case
issued final orders determining the rights of litigants. In Ohms, the commissioner issued
a final judgment and sentence in a criminal case. In Holm, the commissioner issued final
orders determining jurisdiction and the validity of a foreign judgment. In both Ohms and
Holm, the orders were not subsequently reviewed and signed by a judge.1 This is one of
the critical factors in this case.
If a court commissioner makes a final determination, which determination is not a
recommendation, then the court commissioner's actions are unconstitutional. The Utah
Code and Utah court rules have been crafted with this understanding in mind, and the
commissioner's actions in this case were consistent with statute, rule and case law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-31(8) states that "the Judicial Council shall make uniform
statewide rules defining the duties and authority of court commissioners for each level of
court they serve." The statute further states that "the rules shall at a minimum establish:
(a) types of cases and matters commissioners may hear; (b) types of orders commissioners
may recommend; (c) types of relief commissioners may recommend; and (d) procedure
for timely judicial review of recommendations and orders made by court commissioners."
]

The review and "ratification" in Holm did not treat the commissioner's orders as
recommendations. Holm had filed a motion for relief from the commissioner's orders,
and not an objection to the recommendation. The judge did not sign any orders.
6

Rule 6-401(2)(D) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration states that a court
commissioner may "make recommendations to the court regarding any issue, int hiding a
recommendation for entry of final judgment, in domestic relations or spouse abuse cases
at any stage of the proceedings." Rule 6-401(2)(F) authorizes a commissioner to
"conduct evidentiary hearings," in order to make such recommendations. K ule 7(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "a recommendation of a court commissioner is
the order of the court until modified by the court. A party may object to the
recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as filing a motion within ten
days after the recommendation is made in open court."
The statute and rule thus create a process by which a commissioner may hear and
make recommendations in cohabitant abuse cases. The commissioner's recommendation
is subject to review by a district court judge. Under these authorities, a commissioner
does not have final decision-making authority. An Article VIII judge is ultimately
responsible for the orders that are issued out of a court. In practice, a judge reviews every
protective order recommended by a commissioner and the judge is presumably
accountable and responsible for the adequacy of the review that is conducted.2
2

The Appellant has suggested that the judge "rubber stamped" the commissioner's
recommendation. However, the Appellant has not provided any facts to support this
argument. In addition, the Petitioner has not addressed what the remedy would be for a
7

The case law, statute and rules thus permit court commissioners to conduct factfinding hearings and recommend orders in cohabitant abuse cases. Based on the
precedent in Ohms, the statute and rule are unconstitutional. The only issue is then
whether the actions of the court commissioner exceeded the scope of authority delegated
under statute and rule (as occurred in Holm).
According to the facts provided by the Appellant, the commissioner conducted a
fact-finding hearing and signed a protective order at the end of the hearing. R. 28. The
protective order was then reviewed by a district court judge. The district court judge
signed the protective order on the same date that the protective order hearing was
conducted. R. 35. The protective order signed by the commissioner and the findings
made on record, served as a recommendation which was reviewed by the district court
judge. In short, "the commissioner's actions led to recommendations which resulted in
final review and signature by a judge." Ohms. 881 P.2d at 851, n. 17. The district court
judge retained final authority to determine the controversy between the parties and to
decide whether the court would issue a protective order, and what the terms of the order
would be. The Appellant has not provided any facts to suggest otherwise.

"rubber stamp review." Such an act would not necessarily affect the constitutionality of
the commissioner's practices.
>
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In both Holm and Ohms, the court commissioners' actions did not serve as
recommendations. A district court judge did not sign a final order in either case. The
Appellant asks this court to "conclude that allowing court commissioners to conduct full
evidentiary hearings is an unconstitutional delegation of a core judicial function."
However, the Ohms court specifically stated that court commissioners mav "conduct factfinding hearings." The practice in this case is therefore constitutionally valid.
The Petitioner has raised a couple of other issues which will be briefly addressed,
because the Appellee has apparently not filed a brief. The Petitioner claims that the
commissioner was prohibited from conducting a hearing in this case because the parlies
contested the protective orders. The Appellant is misreading the rule in this regard.
Rule 6-401(2)(J) permits a commissioner to conduct settlement conferences in
domestic relations cases and to certify any unsettled issues to the district court. This case
is not a domestic relations case. It is a spouse abuse case. Rule 6-401(2)(D) clearly
distinguishes between the two types of cases. The commissioner also did not conduct a
settlement conference. Therefore, this provision did not apply.
Also, the purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to gather evidence and make
findings on contested issues. The rule does not contemplate that the only role a

9

commissioner may play is to preside over a proceeding in which litigants only read a
stipulation into the record.
The Appellant also claims that the court was required to hold a de novo hearing
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.3. There is nothing in this statute that requires a de
novo hearing. The statute states that a litigant may object to a commissioner's
recommendation. The court must then hold a hearing within 20 days. The hearing would
be held to specifically address the objection and not necessarily to hear anew the entire
matter. In this case, the court held a hearing and reviewed the Appellant's objection to
the proceeding, which objection was based on the constitutional authority of the
commissioner. The Appellant did not object to the commissioner's findings or ultimate
recommendations. There is nothing in the statute or rule that requires a de novo hearing
on the contested issues between the parties, when a party files an objection. The statute
only requires a hearing on the objection.
Conclusion
The Appellant has not made a sufficient argument against the constitutionality of
court commissioner practices. The Appellant has not addressed the Ohms case, which
tacitly approved the court commissioner practice of conducting fact-finding hearings and
making recommendations in civil cases. The commissioner followed that practice in this
10

case. It was the district court judge who ultimately signed and issued the final protective
order. This court should reject the Appellant's constitutional arguments.
DATED t h i s Z & day of March, 2007.
^
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Brent Johnson, Attorney for
the Utah Judicia/Council
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